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Lord Robert Cecil, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood had a career in public life 
spanning more than half a century.  He was a man with an impeccable 
political pedigree, being the son of the great nineteenth century 
Conservative Prime Minister, the Third Marquess of Salisbury, and a 
descendant of Robert Cecil, favourite advisor to Elizabeth I.  He was 
known also for his personal and political integrity and for his staunch 
independence of mind.  Because of this, many found him frustrating and 
difficult to relate to.  For example, between 1903-1913 he championed the 
Free Trade lobby and openly defied the wishes of his cousin and party 
leader, Arthur Balfour.1  But it is for his involvement in and promotion of 
the League of Nations and international peace after the First World War 
that he is chiefly remembered.  Most of his remarks on these subjects date 
from the interwar period.  But Cecil also remained an active commentator 
on international affairs for more than fifteen years after the outbreak of the 
Second World War, his last comments being on the conduct of the Korean 
War when he was almost ninety.  Cecil also wrote about many more issues 
concerning international affairs than the League and the pursuit of peace.  
He wrote about European unification; about the diplomatic dynamics of 
the Cold War and the atomic age as well as the establishment of the United 
Nations.  The history of the events about which Cecil concerned himself 
has been covered by numerous historical studies and consequently, it is not 
the intention of this chapter to cover them in detail here.  Instead, the aim 
is to create a framework from which to construct a mental map of Cecil’s 
attitude towards international affairs from the end of the First World War 
until his final remarks on Cold War diplomacy; to ask whether there was a 
consistent pattern in his thinking and to trace the origins of that.  From 
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this, two prevailing themes emerge.  First, that it is an oversimplification 
to view Cecil as an idealist, with an unrealistic belief in the willingness of 
the international community to relinquish war.  Instead, he adopted a more 
pragmatic approach.  On foreign affairs,  he did not adhere to a particular 
party political message and believed that the most appropriate response to 
an act of aggression or breach of treaty should be determined by the 
willingness of the parties concerned to submit to League arbitration.  The 
second theme relates to his attitude towards the general conduct of 
diplomacy.  Here it is evident that Cecil was one of the few British 
statesmen who believed that the new conference diplomacy of the post-
war First World War era provided the optimum framework for the 
promotion of international peace and diplomatic engagement: an attitude 
that frequently brought him in to direct conflict with the British 
government.   
It is commonplace now to claim a link between childhood experience 
and adult attitudes, but in the case of Cecil this connection had a particular 
resonance.  Unusually for one of his social class, Cecil was not sent away 
to school at an early age, but was educated at home, in a hermetically 
sealed world created by his parents at the family home, Hatfield House, 
until he was eleven.2  He learnt that for those with the means to do so, a 
career in public life should be altruistic and determined by the moral and 
ethical code revealed in the Bible and as preached through the High 
Anglican Church.  The principles that all men are equal in the eyes of God 
and that it was a Christian duty to obey the Ten Commandments and to 
live a life of Christian charity played a particularly prominent role in 
shaping Cecil’s Weltanschauung.  When he went up to Eton, his strong 
sense of morality led him to take the side of the bullied against the bully.3  
After Oxford, he trained as a barrister and it was from the late 1880s that 
he began to develop an interest in international law, although he never 
practised it.  All of the Third Marquess’ children were imbued with a 
strong awareness of their father’s contribution to late nineteenth century 
politics.  So much so that when the Third Marquess died in 1903, Cecil’s 
desire to preserve his father’s legacy fuelled his decision to abandon the 
Bar in 1906 and to enter the House of Commons as Conservative MP for 
East Marylebone.4  Cecil’s role in Edwardian politics falls outside the 
remit of this discussion, but it is important to note that it was during his 
career as an internationalist that he believed that he was most in tune with 
his father’s moral code.   He wrote: “…I am convinced that, in advocating 
the creation of an international organisation for the maintenance of peace, 
I was carrying out the lessons which I had, consciously or unconsciously, 
received from my father”.5  Like his father, Cecil was not snobbish about 
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the more parvenu members of the Conservative party, such as the 
Chamberlain clan, despite, in their case, seldom agreeing with their 
policies.  Instead, he viewed himself as a “progressive Tory”.6  This he 
defined as being wedded neither to the view that change was “profoundly 
disagreeable” nor embracing “change for its own sake”.  Instead he took 
the view that “If something seems wrong, I have always been anxious to 
put it right.”7
That said, this fluid approach to politics ultimately set Cecil somewhat 
apart from his father and brothers, who were staunch supporters of the 
Conservative party.   To him, it was the policy that mattered, not which 
party was expounding it.  His resignations over the disestablishment of the 
Welsh Church in 1919 and over Austen Chamberlain’s conduct of the 
Geneva Naval Conference in 1928 demonstrated that he was willing to 
place religious belief and personal principle over party loyalty.  His 
decision to move to the Cross Benches of the House of Lords after1935 
was made because he disagreed with the Conservative-driven policy of 
appeasement of Europe’s fascist dictators.  While Cecil never left the 
Conservative party, it was with the Liberals that he frequently felt that his 
natural sympathies lay.  Before the First World War, he had contemplated 
joining their ranks because the Conservatives had sold their soul over 
Tariff Reform and the reform of the House of Lords.
 
8  After 1916, the 
main stumbling block to joining the Liberals lay in the person of the party 
leader and Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, whom he later described 
as “quite as sordid as the worst Tories with class hatred and 
secularism…”. 9  After the war, as Acting Foreign Secretary, he despised 
Lloyd George’s egotistic conduct of the peace negotiations and the 
subsequent conferences they spawned as well as his “eclipsing” of the 
Foreign Office.10   It is for this reason that during Lloyd George’s second 
administration, Cecil pressed for the former Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward 
Grey, to challenge the Prime Minister for the leadership of the Liberal 
party.  At no point did Cecil claim that if his preferred course of action 
was successful that he would join the Liberal party, but the fact that he 
lobbied Grey and Asquith, as well as other leading Liberals, such as 
Walter Runciman, suggests that he entertained the possibility. 11  It is 
unusual for a member of one political party to lobby for a change in the 
leadership of another for reasons which he thinks will be beneficial to 
them if he was not entertaining serious thoughts about transferring his 
political allegiance.  Cecil also believed that the Liberals were also more 
likely to be responsive to the promotion of the work of the League of 
Nations.12  The Conservative policy of “passive conservatism”, while it 
made sense in controlling the economy, was dangerous when applied to 
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foreign affairs, although the most likely reason why Cecil did not join the 
Liberals was because of family pressure.13  What was required was a 
vigorous, dynamic strategy to deal with the residual diplomatic and 
political issues stemming from the First World War that required Britain to 
take an unambiguous leading role.  At the centre of it should be the 
League of Nations dominated by Britain.14
It is reasonable to see the First World War as marking the most 
significant watershed in Cecil’s career in public life.  And it has frequently 
been claimed that it was the scale of that conflict and the enormous cost in 
human life that it demanded that were in the forefront in his mind when he 
became one of those instrumental in seeking permanent ways of ensuring 
that no such event would happen again through what became the League 
of Nations.
  But it is important to consider 
whether Cecil would have been less willing to leave for prolonged periods 
in Geneva as head of the British delegation to the League had he felt that 
the political and ethical questions closest to his heart had a natural home in 
the political party he had been brought up to support. 
15  Cecil was far from alone in his thinking, of course, and there 
were many who attempted to produce much deeper intellectual 
justifications for their points of view than he did.  Nevertheless, Cecil did 
view the First World War as being uniquely “uncivilised”.  War had 
always demanded casualties, but there was something about man’s new 
capability to wage war on an industrial scale that set that conflict apart and 
so gave the need to prevent further occurrences particular impetus.  Hence 
the need to strive for what he termed “civilisation”, that is a world in 
which Christian principles of tolerance would provide a framework of 
understanding that would help underpin the work of the League and thus a 
rejection of the use of war to resolve diplomatic conflicts.16
That said, Cecil never devoted much of his energies to the 
consideration of British imperial issues.
  Cecil was no 
more specific than this in his definition, although his assumption that 
Britain would be in the vanguard of the pursuit of this goal and his 
subsequent statements on European political extremism make it clear that 
this “civilised” world would be one in which the British Empire would 
continue to exist and in which parliamentary democracy would prevail. 
17  Like many during the First 
World War, he believed that it was important to protect British interests in 
the Middle East against the ambitions of the French in that region.18  He 
was also not alone in considering that a second global conflict would cause 
irreparable damage to Britain’s relations with her empire.19  But he seldom 
concerned himself with countries outside the North American and 
European arenas.  This is significant because the British delegation to the 
League, which Cecil headed for much of the interwar period, also 
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represented the interests of many of Britain’s colonial possessions.  He 
clearly did not view the League as a venue for the promotion of British 
imperial harmony. 
On European diplomatic issues, Cecil’s opinions were much more 
transparent.  He did not share the pro-French sympathies of the interwar 
Foreign Office.  While he understood the French need for security, Cecil 
viewed the Entente Cordiale sceptically, observing that “if you try and 
deal with them from the Anglo-Saxon point of view you merely prepare 
for yourself disappointment…”. 20  The stresses within the Entente 
Cordiale were caused not so much by a British failure to understand 
French security needs, but because after the First World War, Britain 
lacked the financial and industrial strength to take the lead in the 
regeneration of Europe.21  During the Abyssinian crisis of 1935-6, Cecil 
urged the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, to take a firm line with the 
French who he feared were likely to capitulate against Mussolini.  The use 
of sanctions against the Duce was essential because if they were not 
deployed, there was a danger that the British would also appear to be 
adopting a weak line.  Or, as Cecil put it, “…an ineffective friend is even 
more hated than a frank opponent, and France comes in to the first 
category”.22  If the British diplomatic stick did not work in Paris, then the 
French should be made to see that “…what is sauce for the Abyssinian 
goose will be sauce for the French gander.”23
Likewise his attitude towards Germany was also somewhat at odds 
with the policy of reconciliation that was such a feature of British 
government policy during the interwar period.  What the Germans 
required, he argued, was a firm hand, because “[T]hey are stupid 
people…and very backward in intellectual and spiritual civilisation.  The 
reason they advocate force is because it is really almost the only way of 
dealing with their own people.”  A policy of “sweet reasonableness” was 
unlikely to yield results.
    
24  That said, even in matters concerning 
Germany, diplomatically there was little that could not be resolved if she 
remained in the League.  He went against the wishes of the Foreign 
Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, during the League Council Crisis of 1926, 
openly promoting German admission to a permanent seat on that body, 
and despite his exasperation at Hitler’s foreign policy exploits a decade 
later, never lost hope that a German delegation would once again return to 
Geneva.25  However, by 1936, Cecil was on record as being “…one of 
those who believe that Germany is preparing for war.”  In what proved to 
be a prophetic anticipation of the policy of appeasement, he argued that 
Hitler “…intends to make a variety of demands which, she believes, may 
end in war and she is preparing herself for that contingency,” because “it is 
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impossible to believe that Germany would have spent vast sums of money, 
would have carried an elaborate war propaganda, would have run the risk 
of hostility caused by the anxiety of her neighbours unless she has in mind 
the eventuality of war…”.26
Cecil’s attitude towards the role of the United States in international 
diplomacy after 1919 was centred on American absence from the League 
of Nations.
 
27  He was not resentful of this, but convinced him that the 
Americans required special treatment, additional incentives to play a 
leading role in defending the post-war peace settlements and in the 
economic regeneration of Europe.28  To this end, he made a number of 
visits to Washington, primarily as the guest of the Carnegie Foundation 
and undertook a lecture tour in 1923 of New England, visiting Boston and 
New York, to promote the work of the League.  This tour also coincided 
with the realisation that a purely European solution to the reparations 
problem was unlikely to be reached.  To this end, he told the American 
journalist, Frederick Dixon: “…Would it not be well…for the 2 sides of 
the Atlantic to take counsel together?  To talk things over?  And if that is 
to be done is it not better that such talk should be not just isolated efforts, 
but part of a regular scheme so that they shall produce some permanent 
effect, and not just run away into the sand?”29
In other areas of international diplomacy, he recommended British 
tolerance of the American position.  During the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference, Cecil recommended that the United States be given special 
leave to build cruisers carrying eight inch guns.
   
30  And during the 
negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact the following year, when Austen 
Chamberlain raised concerns about American insistence on retaining the 
Monroe Doctrine, Cecil was concerned that the Foreign Secretary’s 
obstinacy might result in the American government abandoning the pact 
negotiations.31  During the 1930s, Cecil like his fellow League champion, 
Philip Noel-Baker, believed that some capital could be made by 
persuading the United States to adopt an associate role inside the League.  
To this end, as late as 1938, he recommended that pressure be brought to 
bear on the Roosevelt administration to send a delegation to League 
“because the future of peace depends on it.”32   By the spring of 1941, 
Cecil had concluded that American involvement in European affairs after 
the Second World War was essential because the events of the past half 
century had demonstrated that the European powers alone could not be 
trusted to make peace in Europe.33
Cecil believed that the most effective way of preserving international 
peace was through the principles of collective security that underpinned 
the League Covenant.  The Covenant was a contradiction: it was fixed yet 
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needed to be flexible.  It provided a minimum rather than an absolute 
benchmark for determining that way in which states interacted with one 
another. 34  As such, it was important that the Covenant was allowed to 
evolve, to enable it to be responsive to the needs of the time.  He 
supported the efforts to reform and update the Covenant instigated by 
Herriot and MacDonald in 1924 in what became the Geneva Protocol, 
although was not impressed by the outcome.35  It had always been the 
intention when, for example, a joint Allied policy on disarmament had 
been formulated, that the Covenant would be amended to take this in to 
account because he favoured “leaving the Covenant as it is and doing 
whatever has to be done in order to secure disarmament by a separate 
instrument.”36  But for the Covenant to work effectively, those charged 
with implementing it needed to do so fearlessly.  When it became clear 
that the League would not be able to stem Japanese incursion in China 
after 1931, Cecil described the lukewarm response of the British Foreign 
Secretary, Sir John Simon, to the crisis as “disastrous”.37  As the 1930s 
progressed, his anger at the willingness of the British government to have 
truck with dictators who clearly intended to destabilise Europe, led him to 
move from the Conservative to the cross benches in the House of Lords in 
1935, and to publish a number of direct attacks on that policy.38
Cecil’s statements on appeasement date from two events during the 
interwar period.  The first was the decision by the Baldwin government to 
reject the Geneva Protocol and to negotiate the security pact that became 
the Treaty of Locarno in 1925; with the second being the policy pursued 
by the Neville Chamberlain government between 1937 and 1939 towards 
the fascist dictators.  Like many of his contemporaries during the 1920s, 
Cecil believed that the adoption of a policy of reconciliation towards 
Britain’s former enemies was a vital ingredient to obtaining long-term 
peace that there was little to be gained through the policy of retribution 
favoured by the French.  However, for him, a vital initial ingredient to the 
success of such a policy was the confidence that no country had the means 
or the will to wage war.  Without that commitment in place, no 
international agreement would be worth the paper on which it was written.  
By the mid 1920s, Cecil believed that the British government had moved 
away from the notion of collective security that was central to the ethos of 
the League.  This was because, as he told the then Foreign Secretary, 
Austen Chamberlain, collective security had proved to be “…inconsistent 
with the spirit and essential requirements of the British Empire…”.
 
39  So, 
in effect, by 1925, Cecil believed that British commitment to the 
diplomatic principles that underpinned the League was at best shaky and at 
worst, that it had been totally abandoned.  Instead, the British government 
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had decided to pursue “diplomacy by special agreement”, whereby tailor-
made agreements were concluded with powers on a pragmatic basis as 
circumstances dictated.40  That said, Cecil did not doubt the British 
commitment to maintaining international security and to achieving 
disarmament, he merely questioned the diplomatic tactics behind it.  But, 
as he told MacDonald in 1930, it was also true that “…the vigour and 
success of the League depends on the attitude of this country.”41  And it 
was by their attitude towards the League that British politicians influential 
in foreign affairs during the 1930s were judged.  He had more time for 
Eden’s insistence that the League could only stand up effectively to the 
fascist challenge through assistance from countries outside it, for example, 
the United States, than for Neville Chamberlain’s “sorrow over a 
moribund relation”.42  The latter’s “defeatism” that also encouraged other 
countries to reach humiliating rapprochements with Hitler and Mussolini 
was effectively a call to “abandon the League”.43  Of Chamberlain’s 
agreement with Hitler in the spring of 1939, Cecil wrote that “The Munich 
settlement has quite definitely shown itself to be a Munich surrender…”.44  
He also put pressure on Halifax to persuade the Prime Minister of the error 
of his ways.  “Is it possible to prevent the Prime Minister from sending 
any more communications to Hitler?…It really is madness, believe me.  
We ought to do exactly the opposite.  We ought to be making, openly and 
will full advertisement every possible preparation for war.”45
Much of the historical literature concerning the League of Nations has 
focussed on its failure to prevent the outbreak of war in 1939.  It does not 
fall within the remit of this discussion to re-enter this debate.  That said, in 
sketching Cecil’s mind map, it is important to examine his attitude 
towards the League in another context.  That is, the League as an example 
of the new diplomacy.  Zara Steiner has argued recently that it is 
debateable whether there was anything “new” about the way in which 
diplomacy was conducted in Europe after the First World War.
 
46  She is 
also not alone in claiming that the vogue for international conferences 
populated by as many expert advisors as diplomats that became 
synonymous with Lloyd George’s foreign policy seemed to have gone out 
of fashion by as early as 1922.47
One of the essential purposes of the new diplomacy was to democratise 
the ways in which states interacted with each other and to promote 
democracy within those states.  The conduct of post-war diplomacy should 
move away from an exclusive club of diplomats and officials and embrace 
  So from this, can we conclude that the 
new diplomacy, with the exception of a largely ineffectual League was 
defunct?  To answer in the affirmative is to miss some essential points 
about the new diplomacy and, with that, about Cecil. 
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the insights offered by legal and financial experts.  For Cecil, this process 
went a stage further.  The war had done much to politicise most of British 
population and for Cecil, it was natural that the greater level of 
accountability the British people now expected of their governments 
should also be reflected in the way that international diplomacy was 
conducted.  He set great store in the importance in the connection between 
the conduct of foreign policy and public opinion.  When the Cabinet 
Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey attempted to defend the pre-war political 
and diplomatic system, Cecil noted that to him “such proceedings seem to 
be out of date and to ignore the growing interest of the electorate in the 
proper conduct of the most important function of government.” 48
For Cecil the relationship between public opinion and the conduct of 
diplomacy had three aspects to it.  First, a willingness to represent and to 
consult public opinion was a sign of political and diplomatic openness and 
transparency and as a check on the excesses of politicians and their 
advisers.  Vitally important if confidence was to be built in efforts to 
demonstrate that the international community had relinquished war and 
that the horrors of the trenches would never be repeated.  Secondly, it 
stemmed from the belief that a foreign policy that resulted in war would 
require the people of a state potentially to lay down their lives in sacrifice 
for that cause.  As he told Hankey, “…in many cases, particularly those 
which directly affect peace, the peoples are more and more taking strong 
views on the questions involved in international conference, and that fact 
that these views exist is an important feature in producing or preventing 
agreement.” 
  Lloyd 
George also understood this point of course, and much has been written 
about, for example, his timing of the General Election of December 1918 
and his use of press barons during the remainder of his second 
administration.  But for Lloyd George and for all of the other premiers of 
the period, the need to take in to account public opinion and to be seen to 
be responding to it, also had a very clear and obvious practical rationale to 
it; the desire to secure re-election.   
49  The governments of the world owed it to the people they 
represented to pursue a foreign policy that would avoid war, preferably 
banning it altogether.  It was a humanitarian as well as a practical gesture.  
Thirdly, for Cecil, public opinion was synonymous with the idea of a 
public conscience.  Public opinion would become a substitute for “military 
spirit”, although he applauded the patriotic spirit of those willing to make 
the ultimate sacrifice for their country, so long as it was a gesture linked to 
the glorification of war.50  That while politicians pursued their own party 
political agendas; it was through public opinion that the “real” view of 
British attitudes towards foreign affairs and other matters was revealed.  
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This opinion was also likely to be consistent with his own broad set of life 
principles, Christian charity and humanitarianism and moral decency.  
This included fighting for the oppressed, standing up to bullying tactics 
and to having the strength of one’s convictions.  That said, more open 
diplomacy was not without its difficulties, and of these Cecil was aware.  
One of the most notable was the slow speed at which it was obliged to 
work.  Full consultation of expert and public opinion after all took time.   
Cecil himself lamented during the Geneva Disarmament Conference that 
“…it adds greatly to the difficulty of negotiation if confidential documents 
shown by one party to the other immediately become the subject of public 
criticism and comment.”51
Cecil never openly labelled himself an advocate of the new diplomacy, 
not least because of his personal antipathy towards Lloyd George.  
Nevertheless, he was quite clear that it was essential that a different means 
be found to the “secret diplomacy” that had been such an important cause 
of war in 1914.  In 1933, at a time when critics of the League were at their 
most vocal over its handling of the Manchurian crisis, Cecil defended the 
new diplomacy in a series of letters to Hankey, who believed that 
international diplomacy should contain a mixture of “secret” and “new” 
diplomacy.
   
52  For Cecil, secret diplomacy was not only dangerous, it was 
rooted too much in “the perpetuation of the methods of the Congress of 
Vienna.”53  Although it is important to note that Cecil’s objections were 
not so much at the Congress itself, or indeed, to the century of general 
peace and stability that it provided Europe, but tot the alliance system that 
it fostered.54  The complex web of alliances, designed to create or protect 
spheres of influence forced Europe into a diplomatically rigid system of 
power blocs.  Consequently, when it became in states’ interest to wage 
war, it resulted in the industrial-scale carnage of the First World War and 
massive political dislocation that followed it.55
A second and by far the most well-known feature of Cecil’s advocacy 
of the new diplomacy was, of course, his enthusiasm for the work of the 
League of Nations.  This provides the most concrete evidence of his belief 
that if a second global conflict was to be avoided then an alternative 
method of conducting diplomacy that renounced war, needed to be found.  
But as what type of entity did Cecil view the League?  Historians have 
offered two alternatives.  That it was a nineteenth century construct, 
brought into being by well-meaning statesmen wishing to break free of the 
traditions of the secret diplomacy but whose mindset prevented them from 
doing do effectively, thus condemning the League to a lack of success.  
Alternatively, there is the view that the League was too radical a 
diplomatic experiment; that it tried to bring about too dramatic a change to 
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the conduct of diplomacy at a time of great political instability.  Not 
surprisingly, there is little in Cecil’s thinking to corroborate the first point 
of view, with its emphasis on the misjudgement of the League’s architects, 
but more evidence in support of the second.  But even here, the evidence is 
not overwhelming, suggesting the need to engage in a wider more radical 
reappraisal of the British League mindset than has hitherto been made.  It 
is important to remember that for Cecil, the League was, in his own words, 
a great experiment.  And consequently, as with all such endeavours, that it 
should be in a constant process of review and update.  Clearly the League 
failed to prevent the outbreak of a Second World War and a number of 
smaller conflicts between 1918 and 1939, but as far as Cecil was 
concerned, it was not usually the mechanism of the League that was at 
fault, it was because “Britain and France would not discharge the 
obligations to resist aggression which they had undertaken” under the 
League Covenant.56  In his view, international diplomacy in the French 
and British capitals was conducted on a selfish basis of national self-
interest rather than in the spirit of collective internationalism.  Such an 
approach offered insufficient foundation to create the means of providing 
an alternative means for the conduct of diplomacy, work needed to be 
done to change the mindset of those charged with the conduct of 
diplomacy.  On these latter points, Cecil was unclear as to how this 
transformation could be brought about.  Although it was self-evident to 
him that such a process would take place – even if it took a second world 
war to force the point home – because eventually it would become obvious 
to all that resort to war was too costly.  It is for this reason that Cecil 
believed that none of the British prime ministers and foreign secretaries of 
the interwar period were up to the job – they didn’t understand that a form 
of diplomacy based on national self-interest would inevitably lead to 
war.57  Consider his choice of language when he described Simon as 
“morally incapable” of pursuing an effective foreign policy and Neville 
Chamberlain as being “entirely un-teachable!”.58
For Cecil, a further way of defusing international tension and 
preventing war was by substituting what he termed “the principle of 
corporate life” for diplomatic and political international rivalry.
   
59  The 
Protestant work ethic so beloved of Victorian philanthropist, the emphasis 
in domestic politics and economics on self-improvement and individualism 
in the last century, the emphasis in science on evolution and a move away 
from the teachings of the Bible, had all contributed to the “military spirit”.  
Much better, he told his brother in 1921, to move away from all of this 
through the promotion of what he termed “the better side of Tariff 
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Reform”, that is through some state regulation of the economy and the 
guarding of British commercial interests.   
There ought to be a move towards “state socialism” and the 
development of a non-conformist conscience, although it is important to 
realise that as far as Cecil was concerned, the former was not 
commensurate with any left wing ideology, but referred to a process by 
which the government took an active (but not overwhelming) role in 
promoting the welfare and economic development of society.60  Likewise, 
Cecil’s reference to non-conformity refers not to the disestablished church, 
but to a willingness to act according to conscience and not be bound by 
conventional wisdom, be that on political, religious or on social issues.  He 
was clear that any heavy-handed attempt at establishing state control 
would stifle some of the individuality that he thought essential to 
encourage.  Consequently, the way forward would be “…to take existing 
units, individuals, classes, nations and try to induce them freely to 
combine to discourage competition and self-aggrandisement as the 
dominant motive of civilised life and substitute co-operation and self-
sacrifice. 61  In a letter to his eldest brother in 1941, Cecil expressed 
interest in the claim made by the left-wing historian and former diplomat, 
E.H. Carr, in his book The Twenty Year Crisis, that “nothing can save the 
world but communism or Christianity.”62  Cecil agreed with Carr’s 
contention that “no international machinery or national policy can last 
unless it is founded on an ideal”.  However, if it was Carr’s intention to 
claim that if communism - a “great policy of social justice” - was a 
necessary precursor to an effective scheme for the preservation of peace, 
then Cecil believed that the end of the Second World War would simply 
produce “a new dose of those international platitudes which were rightly 
reprobated in the early days of the League.”  What was essential was a 
practical policy that was based on a review of the reasons why the League 
had failed to prevent the Second World War before “the application of the 
necessary remedy”.63
A further feature of Cecil’s enthusiasm for the new diplomacy was on 
its emphasis on the use of a more streamlined government infrastructure.  
During the Lloyd George coalition governments, although he was repelled 
by the Welshman’s conduct of foreign affairs, he admired the way in 
which he reduced the size of the Cabinet but increased the frequency of its 
meetings.
  Thus if Carr was right, then the only alternative 
would be a return to Christian principles as a foundation for making peace.  
As it was, of course, post-war Europe, ended up adopting both 
communism and “Christianity” until 1989, after which the latter, if viewed 
partly as a synonym for democracy and the democratic powers, prevailed. 
64  One reason why that streamlining was possible was because 
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Lloyd George was the head of a coalition government.  That type of 
government had particular appeal to Cecil because, by its very nature, it 
meant that the party infighting became secondary to meeting the 
challenges of the national emergency: that it was the issues that drove 
policy and not dogma.  He felt sufficiently strongly about this to make it 
the subject of the Sidney Ball Lecture The Machinery of Government that 
he delivered in October 1932.65  In it, he reflected positively on the 
effectiveness of the War Cabinet after 1916, although he saw little purpose 
to its continuation after the Paris Peace Conference.  Likewise, a year after 
the National Government had been formed in 1931, Cecil had urged 
Hankey to resurrect the administrative structure that had been used by 
Lloyd George.  As things stood, the machinery of government was 
“waterlogged”, with the consequence that the Prime Minister had 
insufficient time to work out which were the most pressing issues and have 
time to respond to them.  At the back of his mind was his belief that a 
premier ought to be able to give priority to foreign affairs at a time of 
severe international crisis.  This he felt that the then Prime Minister, the 
socialist Ramsay MacDonald, leading a country in the grip of a severe 
recession, was unlikely to do of his own accord.66
Contemplating the diplomatic shape of Europe after the Second World 
War, Cecil’s instincts were also collectivist.  Believing that the war had as 
many social and economic causes as political and diplomatic, he 
advocated the creation of some form of European federal unit to minimise 
differences between states and thus reduce tension between them.
 
67  A 
week before the fall of France in May 1940, Cecil prepared a 
memorandum on the diplomatic shape of post-war Europe in which he 
endorsed the Briand Plan as a useful way forward, although he anticipated 
that any European confederation would be primarily for mutual defence – 
a forerunner more of NATO than of the European Union.  But containing 
within it the framework for promoting the closer assimilation of interests, 
especially in commerce at a later date, once collective security had been 
assured.  In which case the confederation would assume the attributes of a 
state in its own right, with its own parliament, legal system, currency and 
flag.  This organisation would become, in effect, a European League of 
Nations super state that would work in conjunction with the larger 
Geneva-based organisation, providing an addition way of monitoring and 
diffusing tensions between European states.  As the origins of both the 
world wars had lain in Europe, it was logical to assume that it would be 
from this part of the world that future conflicts were likely to emanate.68  
The League needed to be reformed first and the body that was to become 
the United Nations, given proper shape before any other organisation 
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could be contemplated.  Just as Britain had played a leading role in the 
League and in the new post war version of the League, it was essential that 
she would do so in a European confederation.69
However, on this issue Cecil anticipated problems.
   
70  He gave 
expression to them through a series of rhetorical questions posed in a 
series of letters to David Davies in September 1939: “Do you really think 
it conceivable that even this country…would accept a system by which she 
would be bound to carry out a majority of the European Constitution?”71  
And so again we return to Cecil’s belief that the British government was 
incapable of setting aside national interests in favour of a more altruistic 
collectivist approach to diplomatic problem solving.  Cecil was thus a type 
of eurosceptic, although not in the same way as the right wing of the 
Thatcherite Conservative party were to be half a century later.  For the 
latter group, any excessive British subservience to the European Union 
was regarded as being undesirable and unnecessary.  In Cecil’s case, he 
simply believed that the British government lacked the will to make a 
concrete commitment to a Europe-wide organisation dedicated to the 
pursuit of peace through collective security.  However, what Cecil did 
have in common with later Conservative eurosceptics was that they 
believed that as much emphasis should be placed on relations with the 
United States and the maintenance of British colonial interests as on 
relations with Europe.72  By 1941, with the war having taken on a further 
ideological turn through Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union, 
Cecil had become convinced that any proposal for a European 
confederation should come from the United States, and that as a 
consequence, the emerging organisation would be a “bastion for the 
protection of peace and democratic ideals”, a conflation of what became 
NATO and the European Union.73  The development of other areas of 
potential integration should be reserved until Nazism had been defeated.  
But until such a time arose, debates should be had about the nature and 
operation of a European security confederation along with a consideration 
of the likely role of a resurgent League in post-war diplomacy.  To this 
end, in June 1941, he endeavoured, unsuccessfully, to persuade the 
Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, to agree to a set of meetings at Chatham 
House under the auspices of the Foreign Office to discuss how the League 
could be reconfigured.74
In addition to high political and diplomatic issues, a significant aspect 
of the League’s work during the interwar period concerned the plight of 
refugees and other displaced groups.  During the late 1930s and 
throughout the Second World War, he received hundreds of letters from 
individuals and organisations representing a plethora of interest groups – 
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everything from the Society for Free Albanians to organisations concerned 
with the hazard to public health caused by the effects of bombing on 
London’s water supply.  However, it is striking that Cecil was 
comparatively disinterested in these and in other humanitarian issues.  
There were only one or two exceptions.  In September 1937, he visited the 
battlefields of Abyssinia on behalf of the League to assess the long-term 
effect of Italian nerve gas during the war two years earlier.75   While he sat 
on the executive council of the League’s High Commission for Refugees, 
his attitude towards one of the most significant issues of the period, the 
Nazi treatment of European Jewry, was frequently detached.  In 1942, 
when the first indications of the horrors of the Holocaust were beginning 
to emerge in western Europe, and despite being conventionally pro-
Zionist, Cecil wrote: “Everyone must sympathise mostly deeply with 
them; but they really are not acting fairly in trying to ignore the limits put 
on the number of immigrants into Palestine so long as that limit exists; and 
I think that there is very strong grounds for suspecting that a section of 
them quite deliberately tried to use the misfortunes of their unhappy co-
religionists to break up the present arrangement in the hope of getting 
something better when that has been broken up.”76  At the same time, he 
shared the view of many that those guilty of war crimes, especially those 
perpetrated against Europe’s Jews, should be prosecuted after the war.77
In concluding this mind map of the man who was raised to the peerage 
in 1923 in recognition of his services to international affairs, it is 
important not to overstate his claim to being a maverick – either as a 
politician or as an internationalist.  His views were similar to many of his 
generation - the debate about what Liberalism and Conservatism meant in 
the first half of the twentieth century; the revulsion at the carnage of the 
First World War and the desire to ensure that such an event never 
happened again.  While the connection between Christian teaching and 
political and social responsibility were always very clear to Cecil, and 
indeed his family had a reputation for being particularly pious and 
sanctimonious in this respect, the Cecils were in fact part of a wider late 
Victorian aristocratic tradition of noblesse oblige.  So then, what is 
uniquely important about Cecil’s career as an internationalist, or, indeed 
  
Most requests for his personal intervention or endorsement were politely 
declined.  The horrors of the Second World War and the decade that 
preceded it did not fire Cecil’s humanitarian soul and conscience in the 
same way that the first war had done.  This was partly because of 
advancing years.  He celebrated his eightieth birthday in 1944 and was by 
then firmly of the view that the time had come to make way for the next 
generation in all things, including the work of the League. 
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about Cecil the man?  Through him we have the opportunity to study for 
an unbroken period of almost half a century, during an era of enormous 
political and diplomatic change, a set of largely consistent ideas about how 
international relations could and should be conducted.  There are few of 
whom this was true.  While Cecil never aspired to be Foreign Secretary, he 
did hold Cabinet rank on two occasions, he was the long-time head of the 
British delegation to the League of Nations and as such had direct access 
to those with greatest control over British foreign policy in Whitehall.  
That said, during this period, foreign secretaries and premiers with an 
interest in foreign affairs were seldom able to make their mark for more 
than five years before they or the party they served lost office.  The 
Foreign Office veered unsteadily from a pro-French, to a pro-German, to a 
pro-French and American bias.  Britain’s status as a world power also 
profoundly changed.  In Geneva, Cecil also brought this consistency of 
outlook to dealings with some of the most important and influential 
European statesmen and diplomats of the period.  For this, he was awarded 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1937 and numerous other international accolades.  
Cecil’s unconventional approach towards party allegiance also poses 
questions about the extent to which British party political agendas were 
helpful in addressing the enormous political, social, economic and 
diplomatic consequences of the global conflicts that occurred during the 
first half of the twentieth century.  The best description of his approach is 
the one he gave himself – an “independent Conservative”.78
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